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Editorial
Will
Arab regimes reform themselves before the genie gets out of the lamp?
Ammar Abdulhamid
June 13, 2005
A few
months ago, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak faced his country’s
parliament and made a rather surprising gesture. He called for the
formulation and adoption of a new bill allowing for multi-candidate
presidential elections to take place for the first time in the history
of that country.
A few days later, Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad,
addressed the Syrian parliament and announced the withdrawal of his
country’s troops from neighboring Lebanon and promised that the Tenth
Congress of the Baath Party will represent a “qualitative leap” for the
country.
But, and as events over the last few days and weeks have shown, both
Presidents’ gestures were lacking in substance. It is very clear now
that the only candidates who will be allowed to run against Mubarak in
the upcoming elections will be those specially screened by Egyptian
security whose main task will be to make sure that no candidate has any
realistic chance of competing against the modern day pharaoh.
Meanwhile, the Syrian Baath Congress has just concluded its works by
issuing certain vague recommendations that fell far short of even the
most minimalist expectations out there. As such, political deadlock at
the top will continue to block any serious efforts at reform in the
country.
Two Arab leaders, two glowing gestures, two major disappointments. The
question of whether Arab regimes can or cannot reform themselves,
therefore, needs to be seriously reconsidered. For these two leaders
seem indeed to represent a trend and not mere fluke occurrences in the
region. The basic feature of the trend is to sidestep any serious reform
and hold on to the business as usual mentality.
One thing is clear though, even the haphazard halfhearted attempt by
both Presidents at reform came mostly in response to external rather
than internal pressures. Moreover, both ruling regimes continue to play
the Islamist card as a way of waylaying pressures and consolidating
power.
Meanwhile, no one is willing to consider that popular sentiments are not
exactly what they used to be, and that the absence of major popular
pressures and protests at this stage does not necessarily mean that
something is not actually boiling underneath.
Indeed, the atmosphere on the Street is somewhat charged these days,
especially in Syria where already several inter-community clashes took
place over the last few months. Some observers suggest that such
occurrences reflect an actual policy meant to justify lack of reforms
and continued recourse to security crackdowns. Be that as it may, the
Street is often more like a genii, that is, it will prove quite
difficult to contain once it is out of the lamp.
For a long time in this region, regimes tended to ignore the Street.
Most regional and international analysts followed suite. The lack of
spontaneous reactions in the Arab Street over the preceding decades, it
seems, has lulled most actors and observers into a false sense of
security.
But times have changed. The unipolar reality of the current world order
is indeed having more of an impact on the region than people think. It
just takes time for things to surface in the Arab World. For the Arab
World is simply too ethnically and religiously diverse to allow for
immediate spontaneous outbursts to take place – there are usually a lot
of internal calculations and balances involved. Inter-community dynamics
have always been the key factor around here.
On a related note, Satellite channels are introducing a new and
different sort of reality to the Arab World, and the boiling in Iraq, an
Arab country and not merely an Islamic one, is sending jolts throughout
it. A mixture of Arab nationalism and atavistic longings in the garb of
wahhabi- and salafi-like tendencies is invading the Arab psyche in many
parts of the world. Secular longings are also being felt, because, in
truth, and official rhetoric aside, they have never been fulfilled. This
is making the underlying social, ethnic and sectarian cleavages much
more pronounced than they have ever been before.
So, and as socioeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate, and as
middle classes continue to disintegrate, revolutionary zeal may finally
be finding a nesting place in Arab hearts and minds.
Coming under these circumstances, however, and considering the complete
irrelevance of intellectual currents on the public debate taking place
on the grassroots level at this stage, this is not necessarily a
positive phenomenon, at least not in the immediate sense. But, it is a
real phenomenon, although many will still like to ignore it, one whose
impact is likely to shape the future of the region for decades to come.
The die is cast.
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