Syrian media reform: a glass half full or half empty?
By Ammar Abdulhamid
Special to The Daily Star
Saturday, February 05, 2005
The Syrian media have not shown any serious signs of change since the
Baath Party assumed power in a 1963 coup. Indeed, Syria's media sector
is one of the most tightly controlled in the Arab world. Most
publications are state-owned, and rarely express nonconformist opinions.
The coming to power of young President Bashar Assad in 2000 raised hopes
that the regime would loosen the reigns significantly. But after a brief
period of decompression in 2001 known as the "Damascus spring," Assad
enacted a publications law that consolidated government control; he
allowed the licensing of just one "independent" political magazine,
owned by the son of the minister of defense; and he cracked down hard on
dissent.
Despite the overall gloomy picture, however, in
recent months there have been indications that reform-minded members of
the regime are willing to allow the voicing of limited dissent in
state-owned outlets, particularly in the print media.
The new "policy" - or, to be more exact, attitude
- appears to be an extension of the regime's tolerance of Internet-based
initiatives launched by opposition figures based in Syria and in exile.
The initiatives, begun in the past two years, offer a platform for
dialogue among reformers inside and outside the regime. For example,
Ayman Abdelnour, an engineer with ties to Assad, founded an e-mail
service [www.all4syria.org] known as "Kulluna Shurakaa," or "All of Us
Are Partners [in the homeland]." Although the Syrian authorities blocked
the Web site earlier this year, Abdelnour continues to disseminate an
electronic bulletin featuring articles by reformers of diverse political
orientations, including, on occasion, government officials.
Another such site is the Tharwa Project [www.tharwaproject.com],
of which I am the coordinator, an electronic platform that aims to shed
light on the concerns and aspirations of religious and ethnic minorities
in Syria and other Middle Eastern countries.
The mostly calm and rational nature of this
electronic dialogue, coupled with the growing realization by relatively
progressive members of the regime that political reforms can help
deflect external pressures (especially those emanating from the Bush
administration), seem to have encouraged Assad and his advisers to
contemplate bolder changes in the media sector.
For this reason, it seems, the president
appointed several reform-minded ministers in his October 2004 cabinet
reshuffle. The new interior minister, retired general Ghazi Kanaan,
quickly pronounced the Syrian press "unreadable" and called for
criticism of government performance to be expressed in the state-owned
media. The task of modernizing the state media falls to the new
information minister, Mahdi Dakhlallah, himself a journalist and the
former editor of Al-Baath, the Baath Party's official newspaper. In his
last editorials before assuming his ministerial post, Dakhlallah
questioned the need for continuing the state of emergency in place since
1963, and called for the adoption of serious democratic reforms,
contending that there was no basic incompatibility between Baath
ideology and democracy. Since his appointment, Dakhlallah has supervised
the restructuring of several state-owned media institutions with an eye
toward making them more professional.
In the meantime, state-owned newspapers have
published articles by well-known dissidents. Of particular note was a
piece by Hakam al-Baba in the daily Tishreen that criticized the
continuous harassment of dissident journalists by the country's numerous
security apparatuses. Baba cited his own experiences, and named
Dakhallah personally as having instigated one such round of detention
and questioning when he was editor of Al-Baath. The article marked the
first time since the Baath came to power that the role of Syria's
security apparatus had come under such public scrutiny.
Yet, a genuine media "glasnost" requires more
than these haphazard and anecdotal gestures, no matter how brave or
promising they might seem. Without the state's clear and public
commitment to open up the media sector, to permit truly independent
newspapers and other outlets, and to cease harassing journalists and
activists, such informal moves will never acquire the necessary
credibility among the country's dissidents; nor for that matter among
international observers, who continue to denounce Syria's record on
freedom of expression. Furthermore, the Syrian regime can easily reverse
the trend at any moment.
For their part, Syrian dissidents have yet to
take full advantage of the small but significant new freedoms allowed in
state-owned outlets. Writing articles that touch upon taboo issues is
necessary, but it is not sufficient. Activists should offer concrete
proposals, programs and demands to facilitate the reform process and to
build a grassroots constituency for democratic change - something that
does not yet exist in Syria, at least not in an organized sense.
For as we know, freedom of the press represents
the first frontier of any genuine democratization process, because, once
instituted, it allows for monitoring government performance and for
holding regimes accountable to the people. Thus, if Syrian reformers
fail to test the boundaries of these new freedoms, however scant or
fleeting, how can they assess the regime's seriousness or push it to
undertake real reform?
Ammar Abdulhamid
was, last year, a visiting fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East
Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He is a Syrian
novelist and social analyst based in Damascus, and is the coordinator of
the Tharwa Project, an initiative that seeks to raise awareness of the
living conditions of minority groups in the Middle East. This commentary
is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin Vol. 2, issue
11 (December 2004)
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/ArabReform
(c) 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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