Why ignoring Syria is misguided
By Ammar Abdulhamid & Moshe Maoz
Special to The Daily Star
Friday, January 07, 2005
It is time for U.S. President George W. Bush, following his re-election
victory and the death of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat,
to reconsider his Middle East policy. The Palestinian-Israeli problem is
not going to be settled soon, even under Arafat's successors. That's why
the second Bush administration should start by encouraging Israel and
Syria to resume peace negotiations. Peace between the two countries
would not only serve their national interests, but could also improve
the shaky position and negative image of Washington in the Middle East
and beyond. Israeli-Syrian peace could help create a strategic network
of pragmatic pro-American regimes in the region, increase regional
security through a coordination of efforts against Islamic terrorist
groups, contain militant Iranian policies, and support the establishment
of a stable Iraqi regime. For Israel, peace with Syria would entail
peace with Lebanon, which Damascus effectively controls, and this could
lead to a neutralization of Hizbullah. Improved Israeli-Syrian relations
could also help push forward Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as well as
enhance Israel's relations with other Arab and Muslim nations - provided
the Israelis do not use peace with Syria to circumvent a resolution of
the crucial Palestinian problem. Peace with Israel would allow reformist
elements in the Syrian regime to focus on the serious developmental
problems their country is now facing. It would also help normalize
Syria's increasingly strained ties with the international community,
especially the United States, and perhaps even France. Armed with a
peace agreement, Syria would feel more capable of complying with the
demands for withdrawal from Lebanon made in UN Security Council
Resolution 1559, which would in turn help normalize the internal
situation in Lebanon.
Less than five years ago, President Bill Clinton was nearly successful
in brokering a historic breakthrough between the late Syrian President
Hafiz Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The remaining
obstacle to a peace agreement was a dispute over a narrow strip of land
12 kilometers long and a few hundred meters wide along the northeastern
shore of the Sea of Galilee. The pervasive impact of an otherwise
seemingly minor obstacle reflected the divergent strategic,
psychological and ideological attitudes of Syrians and Israelis. Perhaps
with a bit more time, Clinton might have induced the two respective
leaders to settle their territorial dispute and sign a formal peace
agreement, leading toward reconciliation between their peoples. He could
have suggested and pressed for a compromise solution for the narrow
strip of land. Regrettably, all three leaders, notably Barak, missed the
unique opportunity to bring about Israeli-Syrian peace under U.S.
auspices, which would have helped contain Saddam Hussein's Iraq, curtail
Hizbullah's militancy and enhance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Unfortunately, during the last several years, U.S.-Syrian and
Israeli-Syrian relations have deteriorated because of several
developments - the Iraq war, the Palestinian intifada and the arrival of
new leaders in Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Syrian President
Bashar Assad and George W. Bush. Perhaps as a reflection of his
political inexperience, or a need to protect himself from that
accusation, Bashar Assad initially adopted a belligerent attitude toward
both Israel and the U.S. and fostered closer ties with Iran and
Hizbullah, as well as with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. He also improved
relations with the Iraqi regime, helping it in various ways during the
pre-2003 war period and beyond, while vehemently opposing the U.S.-led
invasion. The American occupation of Iraq imposed a threatening
geostrategic predicament on Syria, prompting Assad to try mending fences
with the U.S., particularly after October 2003 when the U.S. Congress
passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act, which imposes economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria if
certain U.S. demands are not met. In December 2003, Assad publicly
proposed to revive peace negotiations with Israel with no preconditions.
But neither Sharon nor Bush was impressed. The Israeli prime minister
flatly rejected Assad's offer while Bush would not urge Sharon to resume
peace negotiations with Syria.
In some Bush administration quarters there have been those advocating
attacking Syria, on the grounds it is a de facto member of the "Axis of
Evil." Such ill-advised action would be disastrous for U.S. interests in
the Middle East and would undermine stability in the region. The Bush
administration should take advantage of Syria's regional predicament to
bring Damascus into the fold of pragmatic Arab regimes. If Syria pursues
economic and political reforms, ceases its support for Hizbullah, Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, and stops supporting anti-American insurgents in Iraq
(contrary to recent reports the Syrian regime seems quite serious in its
efforts to satisfy U.S. demands in this regard), the U.S. should reward
Syria with financial help and investments, as part of its effort to
support reform activities throughout the region. Washington should also
induce Israel to respond more positively to recent peace overtures from
the Syrians - where Damascus again seemed to suggest it would negotiate
without preconditions - in a process that should lead to a peace
agreement. This would serve the vested interests of the two parties as
well as those of the U.S. Furthermore, a stable Israeli-Syrian
relationship would help facilitate a fair settlement to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in light of the flexibility of
the anticipated Palestinian leadership.
Ammar Abdulhamid,
a Syrian novelist and social analyst based in Damascus, is currently a
visiting fellow at the Saban Center for Middle Eastern studies at the
Brookings Institution. Moshe Maoz, an Israeli professor of Middle
Eastern studies at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is currently a Jennings
Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.
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