Managing Transition
Few guidelines for a velvet revolution in Syria
December 31, 2005
The preceding four decades of the history of our country have been
marked by tyrannical rule, unbridled corruption and gross mismanagement
on part of the ruling military junta and their civilian lackeys. The
last five years in particular have witnessed much political and economic
adventurism by our current rulers, the so-called New Guard, with their
policies leading to a further narrowing down of the power base of the
regime. Indeed, it has become obvious now that the decision-making
process was, in effect, reduced to a small and corrupt clique centered
on the President and his immediate family members and friends.
Recent developments, however, including the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1636 and 1644 have the potential of helping us change
this dismal situation, as they bring more and more international
pressures on this regime and as its past and recent record of oppression
and violence in both Lebanon and Syria undergo more international
scrutiny.
This situation, therefore, has the potential of helping us inaugurate a
new phase in the contemporary history of our country, one full of
promise and progress, one capable of enabling Syria to finally join the
ranks of modernizing and democratizing states.
In order to capitalize on this potential, however, we in the Opposition,
regardless of whether we act as members of organized parties or as
individual activists and dissidents, can no longer rely solely on the
issuance of declarations and manifestos, no matter how brave and
ground-breaking they happen to be. Nor can we remain fearful with regard
to engaging the outside world and the main powers shaping the region
today. True, we cannot peg our hopes on outside support, but we cannot
ignore the outside world either. Inability or unwillingness to engage
the world beyond will reflect negatively on our abilities and
credibility as leaders.
Indeed, we need to adopt a clearer more direct course of action, one
that can facilitate the management of the transitional period from
tyranny to democracy, pave the way towards a peaceful regime-change,
marking at earnest of the onset of the necessary and long-awaited
electoral processes and the rule of law in the country, and help
renormalize Syria’s relations with the international community. Only
this can now help the country to stave off the increasing likelihood of
international isolation, sanctions and implosion.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the status quo can be maintained for
a long time under this extremely brittle regime. Considering the
developments of the lat few years, it is now evident that it is the
regime’s staying in power rather than its outright ouster that is more
likely to pave the way for total disintegration of law and order in the
country, and a descent into an ethnic and sectarian quagmire, as is the
case in neighboring Iraq.
For, more intercommunity clashes took place under President Bashar al-Assad,
who came to power in September 2000, than under any of his predecessors
since the emergence of the modern state of Syria in 1920, as we may
recollect. The clashes have pitted at various times, Druses against
Bedouins, Kurds against Arabs, Assyrians against Arabs, Alawites against
Ismailites and, more recently, Arab tribes against each other. None of
the basic issues involved have been addressed, not to mention resolved,
by the current regime despite repeated promises to this effect.
Meanwhile, the entire country is still ruled under emergency laws first
declared in 1963. Still, and ever since the clashes between Arabs and
Kurds back in March 2003, the northeastern parts of the country have
come to be ruled more directly by the various security apparatuses
established by the regime rather than civilian rule, with the Kurdish
community suffering the brunt of the crackdown and with inter-community
and inter-tribal tensions between the various groups involved rising to
new heights.
Still, and rather than imposing their will, the central authorities seem
to be playing right into the hands of local politics upsetting the
existing local power arrangements. Meanwhile, controls over the long
borders with Iraq seem non-existing at this stage. The central
authorities are simply not in a position to get local communities to be
more cooperative, without cracking down fiercely on corruption and
without introducing a whole new socioeconomic package and a whole new
political arrangement to regain the loyalty and trust of the various
constituent communities in these areas. But our current leaders don’t
seem to have a clue as to how this can be done. The necessary will seems
to be sorely lacking as well.
This situation where the brittleness of the regime seems to be
reflecting and feeding the brittleness of the state itself poses many
serious challenges to the continued viability of the state. The existing
regime has had ample opportunities to mend its ways and introduce the
necessary reform packages that the country desperately needs, but, so
far, it has failed to do so. This lends more credence to the argument
that the regime, the new President included, is in fact part and parcel
of the problem rather than the solution, hence the necessity of brining
about its removal, albeit by peaceful means.
This is the main challenge ahead, and the following is intended to offer
a few brief guidelines that could help crystallize the necessary action
plan that needs to be adopted in order to effectively meet this
challenge while ensuring the stability of the country, and bringing
about the establishment of a state where democratic norms and the rule
of law prevail and the basic civic rights of all its citizens are
respected.
The guidelines have been prepared on the basis of an in-depth of review
of the experiences of many states that have undergone a similar
transition, and are, therefore, based on data derived from actual
experiences rather than theoretical frameworks and considerations. It is
hoped that these guidelines will prove helpful to the Syrian opposition
and will stimulate debate on practical steps and measures that need to
be adopted in the difficult yet critical weeks and months ahead.
THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP
The issue of leadership is too complex a topic to be given its right due
in this context. Still we do need to stress two important points here
that are often ignored. The first pertains to the necessity of
differentiating between the roles of “spiritual” leaders and ideologues
on the one hand, and the role of public leaders on the other.
The “spiritual” leaders, or to be more specific, the founders and
ideologues of political movements, may not necessarily be the best
persons that can represent their parties to the media and the public at
large, especially when we consider the demographics involved, as well as
the nature of contemporary media with its emphasis on image.
Projecting, cultivating and maintaining the “right image” is, indeed, of
paramount importance these days. Continuous exposure to western
entertainment programs and satellite news have led to a situation where
our people, despite the lack of democratic experimentations in the
country, are not necessarily any less sophisticated or meticulous in
their demands and expectations than their western counterparts, at least
when it comes to respecting their minds and maintaining certain
appearances.
For this reason, opposition groups need to give some serious thoughts to
the issue of public image and the necessity of maintaining a two-tier
leadership with regard to political movements. Indeed, and while
charismatic and inspiring public figures are born and not made, good
public figures are made. In the absence of the former, there is no
excuse for not providing the latter. People cannot be inspired by a
faceless opposition, or by one that fields a group of people whose
public image, frankly, is suitable neither for continuous media exposure
nor for the tastes of the critically important younger end of spectrum
of the electoral demographics.
In order to tackle this challenge, opposition group needs to consult
image makers and public relations experts. Providing leaders is a must,
and this task cannot be handled in an off-handed manner. It has long
become a science in the West, and there are quite a number of
international companies who would be willing to offer their help and
expertise in this matter.
The second point that needs to be made relates to the critical role that
technocrats can play in providing the vision necessary for the
establishment of the various platforms of political parties. We in the
Opposition are often too focused on surviving the usual cat-and-mouse
game with the authorities that we often neglect the necessity of having
clear platforms and programs. Unfortunately, however, no amount of
public sympathy for our plight and trial can help us generate the
necessary popular support that our movements, organizations and parties
do sorely need. Obtaining popular support requires organization, vision
and a sense and an aura of professionalism.
For this reason, opposition party leaders need to surround themselves
with qualified professionals that can help engender popular trust. These
professionals should be divided into committees and commissioned to
undertake special studies on a variety of critical issues, be they
economic, social, political or environmental.
The studies supplied by these professionals can help opposition groups
provide what the government itself has only recently begun attempting to
provide, namely: specific plans for actions and specific recommendations
to meet some of the country’s basic challenges. These plans don’t need
to be perfect at this stage, no plan in the final analysis is, but they
need to provide a credible challenge to the plans proposed by the
government and play on their weakness. Moreover, the specificity of the
proposals and the ability to cater to popular expectations and demands
could become a major source of attraction, credibility and legitimacy.
Indeed, we have to establish a parallel government of sorts and work to
get public approval and support for its programs and its overall vision
for the country and its future.
THE VISION THING
No forward movement can be obtained without the aid of a vision, no
matter how sketchy it could be at first. Visions are necessary to give a
sense of context for the people, a sense of continuity and direction, a
sense of familiarity and framework with which to identity, a compass of
sorts, in brief a real sense of hope for the future.
Most rational observers would agree that this “vision thing” is exactly
what was missing throughout the last five years. Before that, the
promise offered by the peace process (prior to its implosion in 2000)
had indeed helped to provide a vision of sorts for that early period
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, our regime’s long-time patron.
For the peace process seemed to have come as part of an overall opening
onto Europe and the US as well, with all the potential economic rewards
that his could bring.
True, the peace process had collapsed before the arrival of Bashar and
company to power, but the ruling junta, it appears, failed to understand
the implications of this for the national moral. They also failed to
understand the implications of brining about the hasty ending of the
Damascus Spring in 2001 without any attempt at a compromise and that
insisting on retaining full control was simply not commensurate with the
spirit of the times, and, more importantly, that it failed to quench the
growing thirst for some new hope in the horizon.
For if hope could not be derived from the peace process anymore, it
needed to be derived from some vision for internal reforms, economic as
well as political. Countries cannot be ruled for long without hope,
especially in times of crises when one’s very credibility as a leader
seems hinged upon his ability to deliver such a hope, not to mention
actually fulfilling it, no matter how partially.
But what the Syrian regime could not deliver then, and what it seems so
incapable of delivering even now, we in the Opposition need to deliver.
We in the Opposition need to come up with a vision for Syria’s future.
If we can do that, then this will constitute a tremendous leap for us
along the path of popular credibility and legitimacy.
The vision needs not be that complex. The constitution that our
colleague Anwar al-Bunni elaborated not too long ago, coupled with a
modified version of the Damascus Declaration so that it can assume the
guise of a national covenant of sorts, should provide the necessary
theoretical framework for the vision. The vision should also be further
explained, defended and elaborated in articles, interviews and public
appearances.
Moreover, the vision needs to inspire a semblance of actions, including,
as we have noted above, the establishment of particular committees
dedicated to tackling specific issues, such as different aspects of
economic reforms, social reforms, foreign policy issues, statement on
the peace process, Syria’s new role in the region and its relations to
its neighbors and the international community, among others.
The work of such committees and the very idea that actual plans for
lifting the country out of its current political and socioeconomic
quagmire are being drawn could provide the spark of hope that our people
are looking for and will help provide the parties behind such endeavors
with much needed credibility and legitimacy. We in the Opposition stand
much to benefit from this, especially if we conducted our work in
cooperation with some international organizations.
The sense of novelty involved in such an endeavor is of critical
importance here. People are used to having governments undertake such
initiatives, seeing that it’s the Opposition that is undertaking them at
this stage will serve to further deepen the crisis of the regime and
will serve to discredit it, especially should it attempt to stop or
impede such endeavors. In a sense, the Opposition will be setting up a
parallel government inside Syria not in exile.
Such activities will also help our different parties and movements come
up with specific ideas for our platforms, that is, the very platforms
that we need to devise in order to warrant the epithet of political
parties.
REACHING OUT
A specific strategy for reaching out to the various segments of the
Syrian people should be developed. The strategy should also include
attempts at reaching towards army figures and some of the known reform
figures within the regime.
The messages sent need to emphasize different points at different times
and depending on the audience involved.
To Syria’s constituent communities, be they Arabs, Kurds, Muslims,
Christians, Armenians, Sunnis, Alawites, Druzes, Ismailis, Assyrians,
etc., the message should be about acceptance and constitutional rights
and guarantees.
There should also be an added emphasis on the civilian character of the
state. Support for freedom of conscience and religion should be enough
of a guarantee for both secularists and Islamists. Going beyond that, as
the Damascus Declaration did when it voluntarily elaborated on the
continued relevance of Islamic traditions and values in Syria’s
contemporary scene without there being any firm commitment offered by
the Islamists in return to the concepts of individual rights, is
tantamount to rigging the game in favor on one particular group over all
others.
The same argument applies for putting greater emphasis on the Arab
character of the state. The fact that the numerical majority in the
country is made up of Sunni Arabs does not mean that the Arab Islamic
culture should be taken as the norm according to which all things should
be judged or the center around which everything needs to revolved. For
the norm is the rule of law and the respect accorded of the basic human
rights of all. This is the true meaning of the civic state.
Designing a message meant to reach out to army and security officers is
extremely important as well, as they remain the backbone of the regime.
This message should be centered on forgiveness for past misdeeds and a
willingness to open a new page and on the necessity of remaining aloof
from political life and not taking sides against demonstrators and
political groups, no matter how big or small these demonstrations and
groups could initially be and so long as the political ideologies
involved call for the respect of the basic individual rights of all.
Reminding people of the fate of Saddam’s regime and its top henchmen
should also be deployed, although in a very subtle manner, the point is
not to scare but to make these important players think twice before
obeying an order from an already decaying regime, a regime that is
clearly on its way out.
Indeed, it is quite difficult to clearly identify figures in the army
who might be willing to facilitate regime-fall, but it is necessary to
believe that they do exist and it is necessary to try to address them
through the media in order to dissuade them from taking part in any
future crackdown. Such figures could also be identified during the
periodic interrogation sessions that we as opposition members and
individual dissidents have to go through. There were numerous incidents
where frank discussions with interrogators did take place and a certain
rapport was reached. It is time to take this rapport to the next level.
For the army needs to be neutralized, and the best way for doing this is
to make sure that certain top figures and second-tier commanders are
unwilling to cooperate with the regime should it opt to crackdown.
Moreover, there could exist now certain ranking officers in the army who
might need to hear that a move on their part could receive popular
support should it take place and commit itself to certain specific
programs of reform. Such development, albeit far from constituting an
ideal solution to the country’s problems, may not be such a bad deal for
Syria. It might just signal a new beginning, a hope for a real change
where none seems to exist now.
Take Mauritania for instance. The military coup leaders there have
pledged to hold elections within 15 months and have declared that no
member of the current military regime may run for office. A similar
situation in Syria could save the country from collapse. Still, this is
definitely not the ideal scenario as we just noted, and constant
vigilance by both the internal opposition and the international
community is required in order to ensure that, once such development
takes place, the officers in charge will be willing to comply with their
promises and return to the barracks.
The need for reaching out applies to the international community as
well, including the EU and the US. Rising above the usual nationalist
and leftist ideologies and acknowledging the need for cooperating with
the EU and the US and finding formulas for this cooperation is a must.
In this world, only large states can afford the mistake of going through
an ideological phase, small states such as post-Cold War Syria cannot.
Such states as ours need to remain pragmatic and need to make the right
calculations and compromises to ensure their survival.
We can be as morally outraged and disgusted as human being as we feel
and need to be. This is our right. But at the end of the day we still
need to deal with this hateful world, and they need to learn the art of
compromise. Making anti-American, anti-western and anti-Zionist
statements might still make good sound-bites in some circles, but it is
simply not a good policy. In fact, it is an ill-advised one. What we
need these days is much more pragmatism and a lot less ideology.
This does not signify, however, turning our backs on our declared
principles. Rather, this is about demonstrating a right sense of
priority – the viability and prosperity of our country is at stake here
and should always come first and foremost on our agendas, much ahead of
ideology.
Moreover, establishing public relations with the international community
is not the kiss of death, even in the case of the United States. Nothing
can be farther from the truth. Given the right spin (hence the
importance of spin doctors), such relations could become a source of
added credibility and even legitimacy. Let’s not forget in this regard
that even the Syrian President, our “Pale Leader” himself, needed to be
“endorsed” by his French counterpart in order for him to be considered
fit for office by the very inner clique that put him there.
Making such contacts at the very time when the regime leaders, including
the President, are being sidelined and shunned by the international
community could also be billed to our people as an additional sign of
the illegitimacy and lack of credibility of the Syrian regime.
Meanwhile, it will continue to raise our credibility and legitimize our
position.
Moreover, and in order to reach out to a wider spectrum of the populace,
the help and support of well-know artistic and intellectual figures
should also be enlisted, especially those of the older generation which
still has a lot of popular credibility and respect. This involvement
could assume the guise of public endorsement of various activities and
programs organized by the Opposition, in addition to giving regular
interviews and holding press conferences on the issues of hour.
Getting the support of this group will not be easy, of course,
considering their history with the regime and the usual fear barrier
which seems to loom more heavily in their minds than those of authors
and academics, for instance. Still, no one has actually tried to lobby
these figures. But let’s be more frank, none of us has truly tried
lobbying anyone, period.
We in the opposition continue to wait for people to come to us rather
than attempt to go to the people. This failure is increasingly
inexcusable at this stage. Public Relations should now become a more
integral part of our activities. The country’s crisis is growing deeper
by the day, and the need for an internal push against the regime at this
stage is stronger than ever.
Despite the imbalance of power between opposition groups and the regime,
there is no excuse at this stage for failing to clearly denounce the
regime’s incompetence and corruption as being the main reasons for
Syria’s current dilemmas. Rallying behind the regime at this stage and
for whatever reason is simply not a good strategy.
In his recent speech, President Bashar denounced the Opposition noting
that its actions seem to wax and wane in correspondence to external
pressures. Actually, the waxing and waning of our activities seem to
take place more in correspondence with the regime’s own internal
confusion and contradictory messages than anything else. As such, the
initiative is still left in the hands of the regime, no matter how
indirectly. Rallying behind the regime will only increase this tendency
and will never allow us to develop our own independent “personality.”
On a related note, an argument can also be made for the necessity of
acquiring the support of some of the country’s moderate religious
leaders from all sects and denominations, and of some of the country’s
better known businessmen and entrepreneurs, irrespective of past-ties to
the regime. The anti-regime coalition should be as all encompassing as
it can be in order to ensure wider popular approval and support.
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
In the struggle for the hearts and minds of our people, the media is
definitely one of the main battlefields. But, so far, we have not made
an effective use of it.
Meanwhile, and despite its reliance on old rhetoric and modes of
discourse, including accusing us of being self-serving and ambitious (in
a culture that remains overly suspicious of ambition) and working for
foreign powers, and despite resorting to old tactics, including
organized mass demonstrations and the commissioning of patriotic songs
and plays, the regime has certainly had ample chances to get its message
across to the Syrian people.
So and despite their better judgment, and as long as this message, this
version of the “truth,” remains effectively unchallenged by the
Opposition, the Syrian people seem more willing, at this stage, to give
the regime the benefit of their doubt and their fears.
For this reason, we need to play the media card much more proficiently
than we have so far done.
For this, seeking the services of a public relations firm, as we have
noted above, is of paramount importance. A strategy needs to be drawn
for taking advantage of the various media outlets out there, including
TV, Radio, newspapers, and the internet.
Despite the fact that only a small percentage of Syrians have access to
the Internet, this small fraction doe, however, represents much of the
educated class in the country. Hence, its influence in shaping public
opinion is much greater than its actual size might suggest.
Indeed, many in the Opposition seem to have already realized the growing
importance of the internet, and much of their manifestoes and
declarations are more often distributed through it. Still, we really do
need to put a greater effort in designing and organizing our websites,
for so long as these websites serve as the main conduit through which we
tend to identify ourselves and communicate with our supporters and
sympathizers, the impression that these websites give in terms of how
they look and how they are organized cannot be overestimated. The
reasoning involved here is very simple really: an opposition that cannot
even design a good-looking and efficient website cannot be trusted to
run the affairs of a whole country. If we seek to be taken seriously,
everything we do, no matter how simple, need to give an aura of
excellence, competence and professionalism.
But, there is still much more that can be done here. Blogging, for
instance, remains a mostly unexplored tool by Syrian activists, though
it has proven to be a very powerful one in many countries around the
region, such as Egypt and Iran. The same applies for internet forums, a
medium that allows for direct discussion between activists and the
public on specific issues and threads.
Moreover, designing websites for various opposition groups and
coalitions could serve as a very effective way for introducing the
Opposition to the Syrian public. Launching websites on specific issues,
such as the Damascus Spring prisoners, among others, or websites where
specific issues can be discussed, such as the future constitution of
Syria, a national reconciliation pact, intercommunity relations, and so
on, would also be of immense help in clarifying our stance on many key
issues, and will help expose us more fully to popular stances on these
issues.
The possibility of using the Internet for conducting polls on certain
specific issues needs to be explored as well.
There is much potential in the Internet, therefore, that remains
untapped by the Syrian Opposition, and the next few months should
witness more creative activities and projects meant to take advantage of
this increasingly important and difficult censor medium.
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS
People need symbols that they can rally behind. This is true in all
countries, be they democratic or not. As such, this is a universal
socio-psychological and culture-independent tendency. The symbols
involved could be real living symbols, that is national figures and
personages, or they could be specific things, such a flags or a holy
text, or even a certain memorable event, such as a crackdown or an
election.
For us, however, the most likely symbol that can be “exploited” for
propaganda purposes are the living symbols. Flags have never acquired
such high symbolic values in the imagination of the Syrian people,
despite the forced example set in the recent demonstrations, whereas
rallying people around a holy text will be a very divisive strategy and
could pave the way more for a civil war than civil liberation.
As for events, several opportunities have already been missed in this
regard, especially the crackdown that ended the Damascus Spring.
Recapturing the moment is no longer possible. If events are going to be
involved here, their role is to be located in some future date rather
than the past.
For now, this leaves room for resorting to living symbols only. The good
news is that we have quite an assortment of figures that warrant
elevation to the status of national symbols, including people like Riad
Seif, Riad Al-Turk, Aref Dalilah, Kamal Labwani, Suheir Atassy, Anwar
al-Bunni, Michel Kilo and many more.
It does not matter in the least what differences exist between these
figures, be they ideological or even personal. Nor does it matter that
none of these figures seems to have acquired or is likely to acquire the
prominence of a Nelson Mandela or a Lec Walesa. The important thing is
to design a campaign to elevate the stature of these figures and turn
them into household names, symbolizing bravery and patriotism. That will
suffice. Day after day, these figures risk their lives and freedom and
suffer continuous harassment from the security apparatuses in order to
make Syria a better place. Their bravery deserves to be acknowledged by
one and all. This should be the basic message underlining all media
efforts in this regard.
Strategies should include designing special frequently-updated websites
and providing continuous news exposure for them and perhaps help some of
them at least maintain their own blogs.
REACHING THE THRESHOLD
In order to make progress along the road to freedom, no matter how
idealistic framing matters in such a manner might sound, a certain
threshold of popular engagement needs to be reached. The only way for
this to happen is through the orchestration of certain public events
that can attract larger and larger number of dedicated participants in
due course of time.
These events need not be overtly political in the beginning. In fact,
and in the first few instances, they might even come in the guise of
support rallies for the country as a whole vis-à-vis the growing
pressures – rallies against sanctions, but not necessarily in support of
the regime. The important thing is to field numbers and to get people in
the habit of demonstrating, of holding sit-ins, of talking about the
issues publicly and to slowly break through the barrier of fear and
apathy.
The Syrian regime is trying to give an impression of openness, which is
why it has been willing to put up recently with much fervor in civil
society circuits. True, most of this fervor does serve regime stands at
this stage, but with proper management, this could be turned into a more
rational probe into the nature of the current moment, issues of
accountability for the crisis at hand could be raised, and popular
discontent, which is already brewing, especially with the regard to the
unrelenting corruption of the ruling elite, including members of the
President’s inner circle of family and friends, could be channeled back
into the right direction, that is, against the regime.
Communication is of the essence in this matter. A certain “catechism”
would help immensely. For indeed the process is quite similar to
religious conversion, it does require a certain amount of missionary
activities and its does require sending in the right caliber
missionaries, even as sheep among the wolves. Civilization itself seems
to have been built upon the shoulders of such sheep.
Freedom is a cause, and not some hollow word, and it has to be given the
aura of sanctity that it deserves. Opposition to the regime, opposition
to Bashar & Co. or the House of Assad, is indeed a struggle for freedom,
and more, it is a struggle for the soul of Syria and its people. If this
lot should continue to define the realities in which our children are to
grow, what sort of people will they grow up to be?
We in the Opposition need to shake off our lethargy and our fear in
order to give the current moment the right sense of urgency and sanctity
it requires. The Syrians have fought foreign imperialism before, now it
is the time to fight against the domestic one, that is, against corrupt
and tyrannical rule. For it is that latter that has always facilitated
the former.
Moreover, and as we have noted earlier, the latter is also facilitating
the potential breakup of the state, as it is fostering increased
animosity between the country’s various constituent ethnic and religious
communities.
The regime is the major obstacle for reform at this stage. True, things
would have been much easier had this not been the case and had Bashar
turned out to be the smart and capable reformer that everybody wanted
him to be. But he obviously did not. It is absolutely ludicrous to still
wish him to be so after so many failures and disappointments. It is even
more ridiculous to assume that the regime could produce anything but
disappointments and failures considering its track records for the past
forty years. Forty years. It is time that we began dealing with the
reality that is now staring it in the face, namely that the Syrian
regime is totally defunct and that an attempt to establish an
alternative, no matter how difficult this will prove to be, is now a
must.
THE RALLYING CRY: END CORRUPTION OR GO
People never respond to a vague and general battle cry. If we need to
rally the people around us, we need to offer them specific sets of
goals. Ambiguity has no room here. Rallying people in support of ghost
figures and causes does not work. Very few would rally for the general
cause of freeing political prisoners. But more people will rally for the
freedom of Riad Seif, Kamal Labwani and/or Aref Dalilah, as family
members and friends are bound to be involved and they are bound to get
other people involved as well. We can get even more and more people,
however, when we “embellish” the image of these figures, making them
more alive and emphasizing their positive contributions to the country
and the cause of freedom.
Also, asking people to just demonstrate against the regime is a simply
non-starter, especially considering the brainwashing that has been
taking place over the last few weeks and the strength of the government
propaganda machine, as well as our people’s lingering credulity and
their desire to believe in the easier and less painful answer, namely
that, despite the glaring corruption around, there remains a vestigial
amount of patriotism that will not allow the ruling regime to put Syria
and its people in harms’ way.
Our people are wrong, of course, and, more importantly, they know they
are wrong. But we have to let them admit that through a process of
gradual involvement in more common sense causes.
A campaign denouncing those who have been implicated in the Hariri
assassination and demanding full disclosure of the facts by the Syrian
authorities and full cooperation with the international investigators is
now more necessary than ever. The justification for such a step is
clear. Through their corrupt practices in Lebanon, which they have
carried out in the name of the Syrian people, and their potential
involvement in the murder of Hariri these people have harmed the
interests and the reputation of the country and have brought it
international condemnation and dishonor.
The President had promised the people to punish those who were found
responsible in the assassination of Hariri and he promised to cooperate
with the international probe into this, he should be asked to live up to
his words, otherwise he, too, should be considered guilty of brining
dishonor and shame to the country. If packaged nicely and reiterated
over and over again, the Syrian people should be ale to accept the logic
behind this simple argument.
Indeed, the whole campaign needs to be centered on the credibility of
the President. Mr. Riad al-Turk, the godfather of the opposition, as
some calls him, was more than right and more than amply justified in
calling for the President’s resignation. But the Syrian people have not
been prepared in anyway shape or form to accept this “obvious”
conclusion. For, no one has bothered to make it obvious to them as well.
No one has attempted to guide them through the process of discovery.
People should be allowed to reach this conclusion on their own. All we
need to do is raise the right questions concerning the prevalence of
corruption and remind people of the President’s inability and even
unwillingness to do anything about it for the last five years.
Moreover, the Mehlis investigation has made it clear that the issue of
corruption was of probably the single most important determining factor
at play in the Hariri assassination. The fight against corruption,
therefore, should be a national priority now. It does not matter at this
stage who will be implicated next by the investigation. So long as
Syrian involvement in this matter is now internationally recognized and
so long as corruption has been identified as the most critical factor
here, a call for an internal shakeup coupled with an attempt to force it
by taking matters to the people and taking out to the street is now of
more paramount importance than the foolish attempt to defy the
international community and international will, a step that can only
benefit the cause of the corrupt elite who led us to this.
In this campaign, particular authority figures should be targeted and
the President’s performance should be questioned, especially considering
that members of his own inner circle of family and friends are involved.
The need for ending nepotism should be emphasized, and the need for
strong, wise and experienced leadership, especially in these difficult
times, should be stressed.
Indeed, this last point could be the clincher. For regardless of what
people want to think about the President and his intentions, an argument
can easily be made to the effect that he is simply not the right person
to be in charge of the country at this stage. Lack of experience is a
key factor here. As members of the Opposition, we should keep on harping
on this line and we should be able to field figures that can project an
image of experience and sophistication to our people and to the world.
Hence the importance of making contacts with the outside world. This is
indeed one way of showing experience ad sophistication that cannot be
neglected. We need to show that we have it takes not only to tackle the
issue of corruption, but also to redress Syria’s relations with the
international community putting an end to the current crisis.
The recent rumors regarding a potential shake up in the upper ranks of
the civilian government in Syria, which would be heralded by some as a
major step forward by the regime, will not weaken our position here, as
some might think at first. On the contrary, it will only reinforce it.
Should the regime make such a commitment it would indeed be doing
exactly what we need it to do: it would be committing itself to a reform
package that it cannot deliver on, and it would be raising hopes that it
cannot possibly meet.
The situation is bound to bring many disappointments within a very short
period of time. For so long as the structure of the regime and its
security institutions remain intact, and so long as these people remain
committed to their own particular corruption schemes, and they will, no
serious reform could possibly take place, promises and the personal
intentions and abilities of the new kids on the block notwithstanding.
The Opposition must prepare itself to capitalize on this expected
outcome in a few months time. The failure of this grandiose reform
gesture could generate much sympathy for the Opposition cause, provided
we stake our position vis-à-vis these reforms early on, in fact, now.
Moreover, we should organize ourselves carefully in order to maximize
our ability to capitalize on this sympathy, and mount our campaign at
earnest.
The recent defection of Khaddam and his stories regarding the corruption
of regime members and the authoritarian predilections of Bashar and
coterie, and the counter stories regarding Khaddam’s own corruption will
serve to undermine one and all in public imagination. Bashar cannot
retain his image of innocence anymore, he is either guilty of being
duplicitous in the various corruption schemes or of being inept as a
leader. We must not fail to play on this.
A WATERSHED EVENT & THE DAY AFTER
In due course of time, a singular daring step of defiance, or a series
of such steps will take place, often in the face of all plans, for and
against. This watershed event or series of events, will eventually lead
to the collapse of the regime. The collapse could be epitomized by
developments such as the resignation of the President, a sudden
departure, a move by him against certain members in his entourage, or a
move against him by disaffected members of his entourage or by members
of the outer circles of the regime.
In all cases, there is a need for a day after plan, one that will allow
for popular participation in the shaping of the ensuing phase. It is
important at this stage not to be cowed down or let decisions be imposed
from the top, even in case of a military coup. Popular demonstrations
should be organized immediately to ensure that civilians are ultimately
in charge of the process and that opposition elements and not only
members of the Baath Party are taking charge of the situation. For this
a united front should be formed and a pre-approved transitional council
should be fielded, which could then invite members of the Baath Party
onboard to help set the guidelines for the upcoming phase.
At that stage, we should avoid any temptation for settling old scores.
Priority should be given to preserving the stability of the country and
for launching plans for redrawing its current political structure. The
immediate goals should be to return the country to normalcy within a
reasonable period of time (no more than a year). This means that state
institutions should return to full-functioning mode within weeks if not
days after the fall of the regime and under existing ministers or their
deputies. This should remain the case until such time as elections are
held and a new government is chosen in accordance with democratic norms.
Meanwhile, the transitional council should draw up plans for the holding
of popular elections to write a new constitution and a bill of rights
for the country within a period of three months. Once the constitution
is agreed, it should be upheld in a popular referendum. Parliamentary
and presidential elections should follow soon thereafter.
The transitional period will pose many critical issues that need to be
dealt with pragmatically and with a certain amount of decorum and
level-headedness. These include:
• What to do with old regime figures.
• What role the Baath Party can still play in managing transition and in
the country’s future as a whole.
• What role the army and the security apparatuses should play in the
future of the country.
• How to manage opposition coalitions in the after of the collapse, and
how to honor previous agreements between various opposition groups.
These are not easy issues to deal with of course, and no amount
of pre-planning can make them any less tricky. Indeed, the details can
only be handled at the time. Still, it should be useful to keep certain
guidelines in mind for that time:
• Maintaining the stability of the country and a working relationship
between the various communities of the country, especially the Sunnis
and the Alawites and the Arabs and the Kurds, means that transitional
justice needs to be as swift as it is limited to certain key figures
only. One cannot punish all the wrongdoers of the Ancient Régime, nor
can punishment be reserved for members of certain communities only,
regardless of the justifications that can be offered. Justice should not
be blind and should not come at the expense of the larger issue of the
well-being of the country. Justice needs to be farsighted.
• The Baath Party, regardless of its history of misconducts,
mismanagements and corruption, cannot be sidestepped all together. There
are still quite a few believers out there, and quite a few people in
command in position whose legitimacy is derived from Party loyalties.
The new order needs not be established on the corpse of the Baath.
Still, the Baath should not be allowed to manipulate power anymore.
Regime-fall may not immediately bring about Baath-fall. Indeed, and in
the aftermath of regime-fall, we might still find ourselves having to
fight against Baath hegemony as well. There are quite a few diehard
members around, and they might require more time to be convinced of the
fact that the days of hegemony and one-party rule are indeed over. The
more the fight against these diehards last, the more credibility the
Baath will lose and the more legitimacy we would gain, provided we
continue to outsmart the Baathists in playing the media game.
• The Syrian army, security apparatuses and their generals, too, will
need to be appeased. They have been playing the key role in managing the
country’s affairs for decades now and they are unlikely to quit this
habit, especially if the downfall was brought about as a result of their
involvement. The lack of a peace agreement with Israel, the ongoing
mayhem in next door Iraq and the potential threat of Salafist groups are
further arguments as to why the role of the army and security
apparatuses should not be disregarded. There is indeed a serious need to
reserve a special role for army and security officers, albeit certain
restrictions on their activities and mandate and their involvement in
public life need to be imposed. Moreover, the number of security
apparatuses needs to be revised, their structure downsized and their
operations modernized.
• Some opposition coalitions are bound to break down in the days
following “victory,” else they would require to be seriously revised.
Elections are bound to affect the outcome, and new coalitions will
likely emerge after that. It is important here, however, to keep in mind
that such developments are part and parcel of the political process.
There is no need for these developments to be any more fractious than
they have to. The breakup of coalitions and the emergence of others do
not necessarily signify a national disaster. The smoother such processes
are, the greater the public confidence will be in the democratic process
itself. Else, the fanatics and diehards will have more to gain here, and
the stability of the country could be seriously undermined.
CONCLUSION
The struggle for future of Syria has always been an internal one, that
is, it has primarily been about defining its identity. Everything else,
including Syria’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been nothing but
side developments and distractions from this real task. If Syria is to
be a state for all its citizens, Arabs and Kurds, Muslims and Christian,
Sunnis and Alawites alike, then fighting against corrupt and tyrannical
rule should the first step towards this end. For the Syrian regime has
always relied on a policy of divide and conquer to maintain itself in
power.
Indeed, despite all its nationalist and secular rhetoric, the Syrian
regime has always played on the troubled sectarian and ethnic divides in
the country to shore itself up making itself appear indispensable for
the security and stability of the country. But in truth, it is the first
and most real threat to it. True, the problems of sectarianism predates
the regime, but the manipulation thereof by the existing regime has only
made it worse. The situation has blown in our faces once before, namely
in the late 70s and early 80, we should not allow a recurrence of this
tragic development.
For all thee reasons the Assad regime must go. The Syrian people deserve
a strong and modern state, a democratic state, a state for all its
citizens where the basic civil rights of all are respected, and where
the rule of law prevails and state officials are held accountable for
their misdeeds. The time to act is now. It is time to show the world
that velvet revolutions can take place in Middle Eastern societies and
that our people are no less lovers of freedom than any in the world.
TO THE POINT
We in the Opposition should be able to:
• Provide the outline of a vision for the country’s future. More in this
regard is the ability to provide a national bill of right a national
convent than only a constitution.
• Enshrine the role of national symbols and help them in creating the
aura necessary to warrant popular attention and respect.
• Support the emergence of effective public leaders by hiring a
professional public relations firm and by making a more professional and
effective use of the media, both traditional and electronic.
• Seek endorsements from prestigious and well-known figures from a
variety of fields, including the artistic, intellectual and business
communities.
• Send public messages to the country’s military and security officers
and continue to appeal to their sense of fair play and patriotism,
contrasting their interests and those of the country with the kind of
adventurist policies that the Assad regime has adopted, and the
disastrous course that the House of Assad has been steering.
• Encourage the formation and adoption of specific socioeconomic
platforms designed to help address the country’s most serious
developmental challenges as a way of garnering greater popular sympathy
and eventually endorsement.
• Enlist support of the international community, including the major
players in the region. Give contacts with them the right spin,
highlighting them as signs of acceptance, credibility, legitimacy and
competence.
• Never lose focus of the importance of maintaining a constant media
campaign designed to denude the regime.
• Never waiver, or backtrack on our confrontational policies in the face
of growing pressures.
• Maintain a united front regardless of whatever disagreements that
exist in the background between our various groups. Differences can
always be settled later using the desired democratic system itself.
Finally, and throughout the difficult times ahead, we should always
remember that we did not choose this confrontation, and that it was
thrust upon us. We have invested much time wanting to believe that this
President of ours can actually introduce and implement a credible reform
package, that he is indeed interested in reform to begin with and that
he is aware of how urgent and critical the situation is, to no avail.
Considering where we are today, it is incumbent upon us to believe the
reality that is staring us in the face. It is incumbent upon us to deal
with our disappointment and to deal with reality and face the real
challenges ahead. Now more than ever, it is clear that it is up to us to
build the better future for which we all yearn and which we all deserve.
This is a very natural situation for people who are still fighting to be
truly free.
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