The oxymoron of "illiberal democracy"
By Ammar Abdulhamid
Special to The Daily Star
Saturday, August 14, 2004
The term "illiberal democracy," advanced by some
as an acceptable model for future change in many parts of the Middle
East, is, in truth, an oxymoron. Real functioning democracies can never
be illiberal. Nor can they be at peace with the rest of the world, a
fact that makes their appearance quite problematic for many of their
neighbors and for the world at large.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a case in point. The Iranian "mullocracy"
has for a long time been cited as a good example of an illiberal
democracy, in that various competing factions seem to have reconciled
themselves to the concept of a peaceful transfer of power through a
process of "free" elections.
However, based as it is on a particularistic interpretation of Shiite
Islam, but also a sense of Iranian-Persian nationalism, the system has
shown itself to be quite incompatible, albeit to varying degrees, with
the aspirations of several important segments of Iranian society. These
include indigenous liberal elements who were active in pre-revolution
times, as well as religious and ethnic minorities.
The prevalence of open-minded elements within the ranks of the ruling
elite itself and continuing advances in information and communications
technologies acted as obstacles preventing the stifling of Iranian
society. Consequently, a more liberal current was always present beneath
the surface of post-revolution Iranian society, waiting for an
opportunity to reemerge. When that finally took place beginning in the
mid-1990s, a crackdown by conservative elements soon followed.
The success of the Iranian conservatives in stifling all reform efforts
came as a clear indication of the inability of an illiberal regime to
accommodate any of the aspirations of its lingering or emerging liberal
constituencies, especially those who embrace secular values. The fact
that neither religious nor ethnic minorities have fared any better under
the current system came as further evidence of the flaws of Iranian
democracy. As a result, less than 15 percent of the population is
eligible to vote, and the turnout for the last parliamentary elections
fell to below 35 percent.
As an illiberal democracy, the Islamic Republic poses a serious
challenge to another cherished notion, namely that democracies tend to
seek a peaceful resolutions to their conflicts with the outside world.
The revolutionary zeal of the fledgling Islamic state after 1979
contributed in no small way to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's
decision to invade Iran in 1980, even if we cannot deny that the man's
personal ambitions also played a major role in this.
As Iran's revolutionary zeal wore off and the regime found itself
entangled in a bloody war with Iraq that, at times, threatened its very
survival, its messianic tendencies were redirected inward. This resulted
in a heightened sense of threat perception vis-a-vis the outside world,
a fact complicated by the continuing appeal of modern values to the
country's youth.
The militarization and mobilization of Iranian society during the war
with Iraq served as a check against the growth of liberal currents and
allowed the more conservative and radical elements to maintain their
control over the state. However, once the war was over the emphasis on
militarization could not be sustained for very long and needed to be
taken to another level, namely toward the development of a national
defense strategy that imposed less of a burden on Iranian society. This
was the logic behind the Iranian drive for building stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction and, today, its advancing on a nuclear path.
This missionary-messianic facet of the illiberal institution that is the
Iranian regime also suggests that, once Iran has achieved a nuclear
military capacity and starts to feel more secure in its borders, the
temptation for imposing regional hegemony of sorts will not lag too far
behind.
This is, indeed, the only legacy that could be expected from the
expansion of illiberal states. Neither democracy nor peace is likely to
be the end product of such systems. Free elections are only one aspect
of democracy; liberal values are another. Without solid commitment to
both, no state is worthy of the democratic label, and no state will
manage to live at peace with itself or the world.
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