Will the
Syrian regime take on the world?
By Ammar Abdulhamid
Special to The Daily Star
Friday, September 3, 2004
To an outside observer, the Syrian regime must seem bent on pursuing
a path of confrontation with the rest of the world. At the beginning of
the American invasion of Iraq, and thanks to the bellicose posture the
Syrian regime adopted during the early stages of the conflict, a similar
showdown with the US was averted only at the last minute. This occurred
because cooler heads in the Bush administration prevailed in their
argument that a quarrel with Syria would, at that stage, distract
Washington from its main task in Iraq.
Now, and as a result of its continued and shameless dabbling in Lebanese
affairs, the Syrian regime has not only angered the US once again, it
has also alienated a long-time, and useful, European friend, namely
President Jacques Chirac of France. Chirac recently called publicly and
explicitly for the Syrian regime to avoid interfering in the Lebanese
presidential election. When Syria ignored this and went ahead and
imposed an extension of President Emile Lahoud's term, this provoked
consternation and resentment in Paris.
The policies adopted by the Syrian regime in the last few months raise
an important existential question about the decision-making process in
Syria, and more specifically the way the process is managed and who are
the people involved in it. In judging Syria's decision-making process to
be flawed (and we cannot be of two minds about that; the process is
definitely flawed), one invariably sees a need for change both in the
management style by which policies are formulated, and in the personnel
formulating these policies.
This brings to mind a dilemma Syria has been facing during the last four
years, since President Bashar Assad took power, namely that of a clash
between the "old guard" and a "new guard" in Damascus, and the fact that
the entrenched interests of the ruling elite have simultaneously been a
main obstacle to reform and the main catalyst for an impending
catastrophe.
Bluntly put, the old guard's deficient worldview and its desire to
protect its ingrained interests are combining to create foreign and
domestic policies that are, on the one hand, wreaking havoc on Syria's
economy, and, on the other, bringing it closer to an eventual
confrontation with the international community. That the US and the
French are now on the same side of the situation in Lebanon, when this
was not always the case, should be a reminder to the Syrian regime that
European support cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, Europe's
independence on Syria in the past was often more a sign of displeasure
with Washington's leadership style than an endorsement of Syrian
policies or of the Syrian regime itself.
As things stand now, very few in the world are willing to endorse the
behavior of the Syrian regime. In fact, the leadership has become
Syria's greatest liability. The more mistakes the regime makes in
conducting Syria's internal and external affairs, the more it will
delegitimize itself in the eyes of both the Syrian people and regional
and international policymakers and observers.
The reformist elements within the Syrian regime, Assad included, should
realize that the challenge ahead is not about regime survival, but about
the survival and viability of Syria as a state (and ours is not the only
Middle Eastern country facing such a challenge). The leadership's future
policies should be guided by this realization, and an understanding that
Syria is quickly running out of time.
The decision to support an amendment of the Lebanese Constitution to
extend Lahoud's mandate for an additional three years was exactly the
kind of impromptu decision that Damascus should avoid making in the
future. Although the decision's sudden nature seemed to indicate, in
part, an attempt to settle an internal dispute within the Syrian regime
itself, the best way for ending such disputes down the road must be,
instead, through the adoption of a bold initiative to enhance political
reform and openness.
Once such an initiative is announced, it will likely lead to internal
commotion in Syria among those who expect to suffer from a reform
process. But such a step will also be supported by many elements within
Syrian society, and outside. This includes opposition groups inside the
country or in exile, as well as Syrian civil society and human or civil
rights activists, the expatriate community, and decision-makers in both
the US and the EU.
The considerable international support that Assad received at the
beginning of his mandate in 2000, and which he continues to enjoy today
in some circles, was premised on an expectation of reform. Now more than
ever it will be the president's ability to deliver on these
expectations, while avoiding miscalculations of the kind we have seen in
Lebanon, that will determine the fate and future of Syria. But, do the
reformers in the Syrian regime have what it takes?
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