Taking it seriously
Those who think that the difficulties the Americans are having in Iraq are
going to make them rethink their commitment to effecting serious change in
the Middle East and adopt some kind of a neutral hands-off stance vis-à-vis
regional developments are, simply put, deluding themselves. In fact, the
invasion of Iraq promises to be merely the beginning of a long period of
direct American interventionism in the region. Whatever difficulties the
Americans are bound to encounter along the way, whatever changes should take
place at the helm, substituting Democrats for Republicans, conservatives for
liberals, doves for hawks, or vice versa, could affect the choice of the
particular interventionist strategy to be deployed, but it will have no
impact on the interventionist policy itself. The United States has no option
but to intervene.
This is so partly on account of the many vital interests that the US has in
the region--and yes, oil and the special relationship that exists between
the US and Israel need to figure prominently here. But for the most part
this has to do with the region's imperviousness to change, whether as a
result of soft international pressures or mounting internal demands.
The inability of this region to reinvent itself in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War at a time when much
of the world, including many developing countries with much less potential
and fewer resources than those of the Middle East, was experiencing rapid
change has put the entire region in a rather precarious position--it is
simply too vital and volatile to be left alone and unchanged.
The Barcelona Process that the Europeans launched in 1995 was designed to
help the region, or at least parts thereof, to adapt to the new geopolitical
and economic realities that the world was witnessing and deal more
effectively with its various developmental challenges. But that approach,
based as it was on soft diplomacy and a huge dose of pragmatism, has
obviously failed to produce any of the desired results. The various Middle
East regimes involved were simply too short-sighted and manipulative to
commit themselves seriously to the more deep reforms and changes demanded of
them.
As such, almost a decade has elapsed now since the launch of this process
but only cosmetic reforms have been implemented. This is so not simply on
the political level, but even on the economic level where countries that
claim to have adopted more market-oriented policies have in practice only
widened the scope of corruption of the ruling oligarchies.
In the meantime, the Americans have been watching and attempting to develop
their own approach to the region, one based in no small part on the
assumption that a successful conclusion to the Arab-Israeli struggle was
bound to open up the region for investments and change. The disheartening
collapse of the peace process in 2000 caught the Americans by surprise, and
they had no clear alternative strategies to fall back on. The unwillingness
of the current Bush administration to engage in the Arab-Israel struggle in
the months following George W. Bush's election seems to be more related to
this lack of vision than to a lack of interest in the region or
understanding of its importance.
September 11 changed all that. As a result, the Americans are now actively
trying to come up with a new vision for change in the Middle East, one that
is not centered on the Arab-Israeli struggle and that avoids the pitfalls
and indecisiveness of the Barcelona Process.
The Greater Middle East Initiative will most likely prove only a first
tentative attempt at constructing such a vision. Taking part in shaping it
at this early malleable phase will help the peoples of the region take back
some control over their lives and future. Ignoring it or wishing it away in
the hope that the Americans will be disheartened is bound to backfire and
will further radicalize the American approach to the region. In this, the
inhabitants of the region, peoples and ruling elites alike, have much more
to lose than the Americans. It is, therefore, in their interest to take the
Americans and their initiatives seriously and to actively engage them
whenever they show willingness to talk rather than bomb their way into our
lives.
If the existing regimes in the Middle East appear too recalcitrant or
bankrupt to show a more proactive attitude towards American initiatives, the
region's civil society activists and networks, as weak as they are, have no
choice but to attempt to compensate. There is something on the table that
can affect all our lives. We are invited to sit and take part in shaping
it--how can we turn our backs on that?
-Published 15/4/2004
(c)
www.bitterlemons-international.org
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